The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means Business by Whelan, Christopher J.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 27
Number 2 Penn State International Law Review Article 10
9-1-2008
The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law
Practice Means Business
Christopher J. Whelan
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Whelan, Christopher J. (2008) "The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means Business," Penn State International Law
Review: Vol. 27: No. 2, Article 10.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol27/iss2/10
The Paradox of Professionalism: Global
Law Practice Means Business
Christopher J. Whelan*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Is law a business or profession?" This is one of the oldest and
most familiar questions about the practice of law and the work of
lawyers.1  In fact, law has almost always been an occupation that
displays characteristics of both business and profession,2 with changes in
emphasis over time.
3
Why is the business/profession dichotomy still discussed today4 if it
is just a "rhetorical fight" between "bottom-line profits and professional
virtue?"5 One reason might be that the normative question "should law
be a business or profession?" has been the subject of heated debates in
* Associate Director, International Law Programmes, University of Oxford, U.K.;
Visiting Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. An abbreviated
version of this article was presented at the Fifth International Meeting of the Association
of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, Amsterdam, May 2008. I am grateful for the
comments and feedback from members of this excellent group. I would also like to thank
David Hillman (Washington & Lee School of Law 2008) for his research assistance.
1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? xiii (1916).
2. See generally Terence C. Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises,
and Professional Empowerment, in LIVING THE LAW (1987); Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as
Monopolists, Aristocrats and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (1990) (reviewing
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989)).
3. In both the United States and England, there were periods in history when
virtually anyone could practice law, free from the usual restrictions typically associated
with "professional practice." See generally Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal
Profession 1870-2000, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (2008); B. ABEL-
SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965 (1967); Richard L. Abel, The Decline of
Professionalism, 49 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1986).
4. See Samuel L. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the
Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century
Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005).
5. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Confrontation Between the Big Five and Big
Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests of Professional Credibility, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 615, 616 (2004).
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many countries, reflecting ongoing tensions between professionalism and
commercialism in the practice of law.
6
This article focuses on global law firms: those mainly U.S. and U.K.
law firms that practice in the globalized legal services market. This
market has grown exponentially in the last twenty-five years.7 By the
twenty-first century, global law firms were present in 105 cities
worldwide; most global lawyering takes place within and between these
cities.8 London and New York are the prime centres of global legal
services. 9
The growth of large law firms illustrates a shift from profession to
business.' °  Large law firms "were and are considerably more
commercially oriented and entrepreneurial""1 than law firms in the past,
with less of a focus on traditional professional virtues. 12 Global law
firms, in particular, have to be managed along "proper business lines" to
ensure client satisfaction. 13 If global law practice is, in fact, a business,
is there any reason to treat it as a profession?
At the heart of the tensions between commercialism and
professionalism lie two key questions: who should regulate the legal
profession and why? Answers to these tend to reflect two distinct and
contrasting conceptions-or visions-of the nature of legal work. One
envisages an important public interest dimension to the practice of law,
even at a global level. The other recognizes the fact that most lawyers
are private practitioners offering services in a predominantly commercial
context. Nowhere is this more likely to be true than in the global market.
6. See Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values,
Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 1075 (2007).
7. James R. Faulconbridge, Jonathan V. Beaverstock, Daniel Muzio & Peter J.
Taylor, Globalization and Organizational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 455, 456 (2008).
8. Id. at 460.
9. Id.
10. See Robert G. Lee, From Profession to Business: The Rise and Rise of the City
Law Firm, 19 J.L. & SOC'Y 31, 31 (1992); Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Large Law
Firms and Professional Responsibility, in LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 189, 189-93 (Ross Cranston ed., 1995); Daniel Muzio & Stephen
Ackroyd, On the Consequences of Defensive Professionalism: Recent Changes in the
Legal Labour Process, 32 J.L. Soc'Y 615 (2005).
11. ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 39 (Hart Publishing 2d ed. 2008).
12. See generally, MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); MILTON C. REGAN, EAT
WHAT YOU KILL (2005).
13. Laurence Etherington & Robert Lee, Ethical Codes and Cultural Context:
Ensuring Legal Ethics in the Global Law Firm, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 95, 101
(2007).
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In Section II, I outline the contrasting "professional" and
"business" visions of legal practice and the lawyer's role in society. In
Section III, I set out the regulatory "maze"-or mess-that had
developed in the U.K. prior to 2007, reflecting the unresolved
business/profession dichotomy. In 2007, radical and revolutionary
reforms were introduced in the Legal Services Act. The practice of law
is now to be regulated externally from and independently of the legal
profession itself; law firms can operate as "Legal Disciplinary Practices"
("LDPs") or in "Alternative Business Structures" ("ABSs"). In Section
IV, I set out this transformation in U.K. policy over the last thirty years,
from a professional to a business vision and in Section V, I review the
reforms.
The reforms appear to envision a future where the practice of law
should be treated predominantly as a business. In Section VI, however, I
argue that a closer analysis of the new regulatory framework in the U.K.
actually suggests that there is a "third way," or new vision, of legal
practice that has been created specifically-and paradoxically-with
global law practice (amongst other things) in mind. This adds a new
gloss to the normative business/profession dichotomy. I draw some
conclusions in Section VII.
II. VISIONS OF LAW: PROFESSION OR BUSINESS?
A. Profession
Lawyers and professional bodies, not surprisingly, usually have no
doubt about how legal practice should be regulated. In Europe, for
example, one of the core principles common to the whole European legal
profession is said to be the self-regulation of the profession.' 4 In the
United States, the ABA agrees: "The legal profession is largely self-
governing."15
A "measure of self-regulation" is, of course, one of the defining
characteristics of a profession,1 6 and there are several self-regulating
professions. However, the legal profession claims to be unique "because
14. See The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Charter of Core
Principles of the European Legal Profession, Principle (j) (2006) (hereinafter CCBE].
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 10 (2006).
16. Ti-E ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT, Cmnd. 7648, vol.
1, at 28, 30 (1979). According to Stephen Pepper, one of the characteristics that define
the concept of a profession is that it is "largely self-regulated in determining and
administering the qualifications for membership and in policing professional activities."
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613,615 (1986).
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of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of
government and law enforcement."' 7 The ABA asserts that
[t]o the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional
calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-
regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence
from government domination. An independent legal profession is an
important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of
legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
18
Thus, lawyers make the claim that they "play a vital role in the
preservation of society."19 The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of
Europe 20 ("CCBE") goes even further. It claims that there is an
interdependence and a correlation between-on the one hand-the role
of the lawyer in society and--on the other-the nature of the society
itself: "In a society founded on respect for the rule of law the lawyer
fulfils a special role.... Respect for the lawyer's professional function
is an essential condition for the rule of law and democracy in society.
' 21
The CCBE states that, "It is one of the hallmarks of unfree societies
that the state, either overtly or covertly, controls the legal profession and
the activities of lawyers. 22 Therefore, the CCBE is "convinced that only
a strong element of self-regulation can guarantee lawyers' professional
independence vis-A-vis the state, and without a guarantee of
independence it is impossible for lawyers to fulfill their professional and
legal role. 23
The CCBE vision has been endorsed by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities. The Court has recognized that "independence,
absence of conflict of interest and professional secrecy/confidentiality
are core values of the legal profession that qualify as public-interest
considerations; regulations to protect core values are necessary for the
proper practice of the legal profession, despite the inherent restrictive
effects on competition that may result from this.",
2 4
As a result, the Court upheld Member State restrictions on
competition-a Dutch ban on multi-disciplinary partnerships, for
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 10 (2006).
18. Id. 11.
19. Id. 13.
20. The CCBE represents over 700,000 lawyers from the European Union and the
European Economic Area, through their member Bars and Law Societies. See CCBE,
Introduction, http://www.ccbe.org/index.php?id=2&L=0 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
21. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS pmbl., art. 1.1 (2006).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. European Parliament Resolution on the Legal Professions and the General
Interest in the Functioning of Legal Systems, EUR. PARL. Doc. B6-0203 (2006).
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example-on the grounds that the rules were justified to ensure the
proper practice of the legal profession, especially with regard to conflicts
of interests and secrecy.25
The European Parliament has also observed that "any reform of the
legal professions has far-reaching consequences going beyond
competition law into the field of freedom, security and justice and, more
broadly, into the protection of the rule of law in the European Union. 26
Thus, core values "are particularly endangered when [legal
professionals] are authorised to exercise their profession in an
organisation which allows non-legal professionals to exercise or share
control over the affairs of the organisation by means of capital
investment or otherwise, or in the case of multidisciplinary partnerships
with professionals who are not bound by equivalent professional
obligations. 27 As a result of these and other factors, it "recognize[d]
fully the crucial role played by the legal professions in a democratic
society to guarantee respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and
security in the application of law, both when lawyers represent and
defend clients in court and when they are giving their clients legal
advice. ,
28
In short, despite the emphasis placed on market values, including
competition, as the foundation of policy, the European Union ("EU")
views law predominantly as a profession, thereby justifying exceptional
protection. Whether or not this vision emerged for political reasons, it
appears that this "rule of law" rhetoric in Europe is relatively new. In the
EU, the rhetoric emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.29 The
criteria for accession to the EU included, with an eye on the former
Soviet Union, respect for the rule of law. 30  The Treaty on European
Union proclaimed that the EU "respected" fundamental human rights.3 '
Later that was amended to state that the EU was "founded" on the rule of
25. See Wouters et al. v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten,
2002 E.C.R. 1-1577. Note that the rationale of the Dutch Bar Association was that MDPs
between lawyers and accountants threatened obligations of professional conduct because
the accountants had obligations to audit and report to third parties. Id. In this context,
the professional obligations clashed.
26. EUR. PARL. Doc. B6-0203 (2006).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. European Commission, International Economic Issues: Enlargement,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/int-economicissues/int_economicissues99_en.
htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
30. The so-called Copenhagen criteria, set out in 1993 by the European Council,
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accessioncriteria (last visited
July 15, 2008).
31. Treaty on European Union art. F, July 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 191).
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law.32 Rule of law rhetoric is associated with human rights discourse as
well as with globalization in general.
B. Business
However, globalization is itself a reflection of another view which
poses a growing challenge in modem times to the professional ideology.
This view states that the regulation of legal services and lawyers is best
left to the market and market forces. It is heavily informed by economic
analysis and it is this analysis which has been sought repeatedly by U.K.
governments in recent years. According to this view, "There is nothing
unique about lawyers and legal services. 33 The analysis suggests that
the special features of the job, and the Code of Conduct that goes with it,
are "typical of many professions," 34 including doctors and medical
services.
The view that law is distinguished by the unique ethical obligations
of lawyers and by the critical importance of legal services to society has
also been rejected: "legal services are not unique in their social
importance or in their conflicts between short-term commercial gain,
quality, and ethics. ' 35 Conflicts of interest arise in almost every part of
the economy. For example, lives may be at risk when doctors, who
provide services on a fixed fee basis (the National Health Service in the
U.K., or an HMO in the U.S.), are put under commercial pressure to
choose low-cost treatment. Doctors may face commercial pressures to
over-provide too. Similar conflicts arise in other sectors, for example
where the cost of safety is a significant commercial factor.
These contrasting visions of legal practice-and the fact that law
has typically displayed characteristics of both-are reflected in the way a
regulatory "maze" in the legal services market developed in the U.K.
32. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 6, Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
33. PAUL A. GROUT, THE CLEMENTI REPORT: POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXTERNAL
OWNERSHIP AND REGULATORY RESPONSES, A REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (2005). The quote comes from a Report commissioned by
the UK Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), looking at the potential risks
arising from the introduction of outside ownership of law firms. The author is a
Professor of Political Economy at the University of Bristol.
34. Id. at 4.
35. JAMES Dow & CARLOS LAPUERTA, THE BENEFITS OF MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP
MODELS IN LAW SERVICES 5 (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/legalsys/dow-
lapuerta.pdf. The quote comes from an assessment of the potential benefits and costs of
permitting legal service providers to fund practices with outside equity. The authors,
James Dow and Carlos Lapuerta, are Professors of Finance at the London Business
School and independent consultants with an international consulting firm (Brabble).
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III. A REGULATORY MAZE
Traditionally, in the U.K., there have been very few restrictions on
offering legal advice and assistance. Most legal services can be offered
by anyone for free or for a fee. Some important legal services are
"reserved" in the sense that only authorised practitioners may offer
them.36  However, the list is relatively short: conveyancing (real
property transfer), probate, preparation for litigation, advocacy and
notary work.37 By contrast, the number of authorised practitioners who
may offer these services is relatively large and includes not only lawyers
but also, depending on the work, licensed conveyancers, legal
executives, patent agents, banks and insurance companies.38
Even the definition of lawyer is problematic in the U.K. Many
foreign observers of the English legal profession know that it is divided
into barristers and solicitors. Few, however, would be aware that regular
providers of legal services also include accountants, notaries, licensed
conveyancers, trademark attorneys, members of the Institute of Legal
Executives, will writers, claims managers (intermediaries), claims
assessors, financial advisers, online/email service providers,39
employment advisers and patent agents. Indeed, in the EU, well over
thirty occupations collectively qualify for the definition of lawyer.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the machinery for regulating legal
services providers in the U.K. had developed into an enormously
complicated "regulatory maze. 4°  For some legal services, such as
litigation, advocacy and general advice, there were no less than twelve
different regulators; for others, where legal advice was provided by a
layperson, there was none. While some persons performing legal
work-barristers and solicitors-enjoyed professional privilege, others-
for example, accountants--did not. Parts of the legal services sector
were regulated on the basis of the service provided; others on the basis of
the professional status of the provider. There were difficulties of
interface and cooperation between the various regulators.
36. Legal Services Act, 2007, § 12, sched. 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter LSA]; Courts and
Legal Services Act, 1990, (Eng.), as amended by the Access to Justice Act, 1999, (Eng.);
Solicitors Act, 1974, §§ 22-23 (Eng.). [Ed. Note: for purposes of clarity, subsequent
citations to these and other statutes will include the name of the statute and a supra cross-
reference.]
37. LSA, supra note 36, sched. 4.
38. See, e.g., id.
39. See, e.g., Freelawyer, www.freelawyer.co.uk (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
40. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN
THE LEGAL SERVICES MARKET, 2003, at 14, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/
general/oftreptconc.htm (stating the government's conclusions following its consultation
report titled IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 2002, available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/general/oftrept.htm).
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The regulatory maze was complicated further by several other
factors. For example, some regulators focused on standards and rules,
while others focused on handling complaints. Some regulators were
involved in enforcement activity including discipline, others in policy-
making. Many regulators also played a role representing members'
interests. The globalization of legal work added a further layer of
regulation. Lawyers practising abroad often have to deal with
international rules, "super-regulators," such as the EU and the World
Trade Organization, and "double deontology,". a concept which
encompasses the problems lawyers encounter when they face different
rules in more than one legal profession or legal system.41
. In short, the regulation of the legal services market in the U.K. was
incredibly confused, fragmented and full of anomalies. The regulatory
maze had evolved into a regulatory mess, in which the nature of law-
business or profession-and, in particular, the role to be played by
professional values, was confused and contested. The time was ripe for
review and reform.
IV. TRANSFORMATION: PROFESSION TO BUSINESS
In 1979, a major review of the provision of legal services in the
U.K. was published.42 The Royal Commission on Legal Services
enquired into changes to the structure, organization, training, regulation
and entry into the legal profession that were desirable in the public
interest. In general, it endorsed the professional vision of legal practice,
that the preservation of the status quo, including self-regulation, was still
in the public interest.43
In the same year, however, the Conservative Party, led by Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, came to power, a position the Party would
maintain for eighteen years. At first, the view of the Royal Commission
was not challenged by the new government but, later, the foundations
were laid for a redefinition of the public interest based upon a business
vision of law.
The "Thatcher revolution" began in 1985 with the abolition of the
solicitors' conveyancing monopoly.44 Licensed conveyancers could now
also undertake work that had yielded fifty percent of the collective
41. See Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 21st Century:
Implications of the Globalization of Legal Services and the Growth of the "Mega Firm,"
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 521 (2005).
42. See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 16.
43. See generally id.
44. Administration of Justice Act, 1985, pt. 2 (Eng.). The conveyancing monopoly
meant that only solicitors could draft the deed required to transfer ownership in land.
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income of the solicitors' branch of the legal profession.45 Increased
competition, lower prices and the relaxation of professional rules
restricting advertising immediately followed.46 Soon after, the whole
profession-both barristers and solicitors--came under increased
pressure to justify other restrictions on the practice of law.4 7 As a result,
an intra-professional turf war between the two branches broke out. It
was clearly "A Time for Change. 48
Slowly but surely, the traditional vision of legal practice as a
profession was transformed. 49 By 1989, the government stated its belief
that "free competition between the providers of legal services will
through the discipline of the market ensure that the public is provided
with the most effective network of legal services at the most economic
price. ' 5°
In 1990, the Courts and Legal Services Act created the Lord
Chancellor's Advisory Committee for Education and Conduct
("ACLEC"). This committee, comprised of both lawyers and laypeople,
had, as part of its remit, the task of scrutinizing changes to professional
rules proposed by the Law Society. 51 The Law Society continued to set
the rules for solicitors, and the Act specifically permitted the Law
Society to retain restrictions on multi-disciplinary partnerships
("MDPs"), 52 endorsing the view of the Royal Commission that MDPs
were not in the public interest.53 However, the Law Society had lost its
autonomous power to self-regulate.
Prior to the Courts and Legal Services Act, the Law Society had
drafted and approved all the rules, subject only to the approval of a
45. RICHARD O'DAIR, LEGAL ETHICS TEXT AND MATERIALS 66 (2001).
46. Id.
47. See LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, Cm. 570; LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, CONVEYANCING
BY AUTHORIZED PRACTITIONERS, 1989, Cm. 572; LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT,
CONTINGENCY FEES, 1989, Cm. 571. These documents are collectively known as the
Government Green Papers.
48. COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A TIME FOR CHANGE,
1988, at 1. The committee, known as "the Marre Committee," had been organized by the
two branches to resolve a dispute between them about rights of audience for advocates.
49. See generally RICHARD ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE
(2003); GERARD HANLON, LAWYERS, THE STATE, AND THE MARKET: PROFESSIONALISM
REVISITED (1999).
50. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, THE WORK AND ORGANISATION OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 47, 1 1.2.
51. Courts and Legal Services Act, supra note 36, § 19(1).
52. Id. § 66(2).
53. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 16, at 401.
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senior judge.54 Following the passage of the Act, proposed changes to
rules ultimately had to be approved by the Lord Chancellor.15 On the
face of it, this was only a minor inroad into the status quo, but, as the
Law Society put it, it was a "dangerous accumulation of power in the
hands of a government minister., 56 By the end of the 1990s, government
oversight was further enhanced: ACLEC was taken out of the picture,
and the Lord Chancellor alone had the final decision.57
In 1994, the Law Society held a Research Conference titled,
"Profession, business, or trade: Do the professions have a future? ' 58 In
2000, the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"), the competition (antitrust)
authority, decided to review competition in the professions. 59  The
review identified professional rules, practices and customs which had
anti-competitive effects.6 ° In 2001, it issued a report advocating more
competition between the professions and the removal of restrictions on
practice, 6' including the restrictions on MDPs. The OFT also suggested
that there should be an extension of professional privilege to accountants
providing tax advice. In the same year, professional rules were relaxed
enabling law firms to incorporate and to practice as limited liability
62partnerships or as limited companies.
In 2003, the Department for Constitutional Affairs published a
report that looked at competition and regulation in the legal services
market.63 This report concluded that the regulatory framework was
"outdated, inflexible, over-complex and insufficiently accountable or
transparent., 64 The government then appointed Sir David Clementi to
carry out an independent review of the regulatory framework for legal
services. He reported in 2004.65
54. The "Master of the Rolls" is the most senior judge of the Court of Appeal.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 2003, at 99, available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/publications/annual-reports/2003/j udstat03_ch09.pdf.
55. Courts and Legal Services Act, supra note 36, § 19(1).
56. THE LAW SOCIETY, STRIKING THE BALANCE: THE FINAL RESPONSE OF THE
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY ON THE GREEN PAPERS 1.4 (1989).
57. See generally LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS OF AUDIENCE AND
RIGHTS TO CONDUCT LITIGATION: THE WAY AHEAD, 1998; Access to Justice Act, supra
note 36.
58. O'DAIR, supra note 45, at 65.
59. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION IN THE PROFESSIONS, 2001.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. SOLICITORS' CODE OF CONDUCT R. 14 (2007); see also Limited Liability
Partnerships Act, 2000 (Eng.).
63. See DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 40.
64. Id. 70.
65. See DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES-FINAL REPORT (2004).
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The Clementi Report was blunt: if lawyers reject the notion that
they are in business, complaints against them would continue until they
were indeed out of business. 66 The report advocated the establishment of
a single regulatory authority that would take over the regulatory
functions of the professional bodies, leaving those bodies to act solely as
representatives of their members. 67 Quite clearly by now, policy-makers
were being guided predominantly by market assumptions and economic
analysis. The emphasis was no longer on "clients" but on "Putting
Consumers First., 68 Even the review of legal aid funding was framed in
an economic context, as can be seen from the title of the 2006 report:
"Legal Aid-A Market-Based Approach to Reform." 69  This report
proposed that a market system be introduced with lawyers bidding for
contracts for legal aid work. In the same year, the government published
a radical and revolutionary Legal Services Bill,70 the majority of which
was enacted in October 2007.71
V. THE UK LEGAL SERVICE REFORMS
The Legal Services Act sets the scene in the U.K. for what is
"arguably going to be the most fundamental change ever in the structure
of the provision of legal services. 7 2 The Act has three main objectives:
to create a new regulatory regime based on a set of regulatory objectives;
to strengthen the machinery for dealing with complaints; and to facilitate
the creation of new structures of legal practice.
One of the most striking features of the reforms is the extent to
which regulators are now independent of the legal profession. In other
words, self-regulation has largely been replaced by independent, external
regulation and regulators. At the heart of the reforms are three themes:
66. See generally id.
67. See generally id.
68. See generally DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES-PUTTING CONSUMERS FIRST, 2005, Cm. 6679. A White Paper is a
Consultation Paper. This one was published following the Clementi Report.
69. LORD CARTER OF COLES, LEGAL AID: A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO REFORM,
2006.
70. Legal Services Bill [HL], HL Bill 9, Session 2006-07 (2006), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldbills/009/07009.i-v.html.
71. See generally LSA, supra note 36.
72. Simon Young, A Class Act, 158 NEw L.J. 10, 10 (2008). The Law Society
called it "the biggest reform of the regulation of legal services in England and Wales for a
generation." Briefing from The Law Society on The Legal Services Act 2007 (Nov. 29,
2007), at 3, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/dynamic/
lsa.briefing.pdf.
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consumer focus, independence, increased competitiveness and increased
choice for consumers.73
A. New Regulatory Regime
The Legal Services Act creates the Legal Services Board ("LSB").74
Under the Act, the LSB, which will become fully operational in early
2010,75 will be responsible for the oversight of all the legal front-line
("approved") regulators including the Solicitors Regulation Authority
("SRA") and the Bar Standards Board.76 The LSB, whose chairman and
majority of members must be laypeople,77 has been given real power in
order to deliver "consumer confidence.,
78
The LSB's powers and duties include authorising bodies to be
approved regulators of legal services; authorising bodies to license
alternative business structures, approving professional rules, and
directing changes to them if this proves necessary and justifiable;
directing approved regulators to take a particular action, and applying
sanctions if they do not; and recommending to the Lord Chancellor
which services should be reserved services and therefore compulsorily
regulated.79
The Legal Services Act changes the way professional rules are
approved. Rules must meet the regulatory objectives set out in section
1(1) of the Act. These are:
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest;
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law;
(c) improving access to justice;
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers;
(e) promoting competition in the provision of services;
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective
legal profession;
(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen's legal rights
and duties; and
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to professional
principles.
80
73. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER, CYCLE OF CHANGE: ANNUAL
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS, 2006-7, H.C. 676, at 17, available at
http://www.olscc.gov.uk/docs/annual-report-06-07-full.pdf.
74. LSA, supra note 36, § 2(1).
75. Ministry of Justice, Jack Straw appoints first chair of Legal Services Board, Apr.
23, 2008, www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease230408a.htm.
76. LSA, supra note 36, pt. 4.
77. Id., sched. 1, 2(1)-(2).
78. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER, supra note 73, at 8.
79. Briefing from The Law Society, supra note 72, at 4.
80. LSA, supra note 36, § 1(1).
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The professional principles are independence, integrity, maintaining
proper standards of work, acting in the best interests of clients,
confidentiality and, for those exercising rights of audience or who
conduct litigation, to comply with their duty to the court to act with
independence and in the interests of justice. 81 The LSB must act in
accordance with these objectives so far as is reasonably practicable. It
will, however, be responsible to Parliament, not the professions.
B. Machinery for Dealing with Complaints
The Legal Services Act also creates the Office for Legal Complaints
("OLC").8" The OLC is an independent body set up to administer an
ombudsman scheme that will deal with all consumer complaints against
lawyers or about legal services. 83 When it becomes fully operational,
probably by late 2010, it will become the single point of entry for all
consumer complaints about lawyers and legal services. It will replace
and reinforce the current machinery which was developed during the
1990s to tackle perceived shortcomings in the professional responses to
consumer complaints. This machinery will be briefly reviewed here.
The Legal Services Ombudsman ("LSO"), appointed by the Lord
Chancellor, reviews the way professional bodies handle consumer
complaints about solicitors, barristers, legal executives, licensed
conveyancers and patent agents. The LSO, who cannot be a qualified
lawyer, is completely independent of the legal profession.
84
There is also a Legal Services Complaints Commissioner
("LSCC"). If it appears to the Secretary of State that complaints about
members of any professional body are not being handled efficiently, he
may require the LSCC to consider exercising her authority under section
52(2) of the Access to Justice Act of 1999.85 This authority includes the
power to require the professional body to provide information or make
reports to the LSCC about the handling of complaints about its members;
to investigate the handling of complaints about the members of a
professional body; to set targets in relation to the handling of complaints;
and to require a professional body to submit to the LSCC a plan for the
handling of complaints about its members.
86
81. Id. § 1(3).
82. Id. § 114(1).
83. Id. pt. 6. Professional disciplinary matters remain the responsibility of the
approved regulators. Id.
84. Courts and Legal Services Act, supra note 36, § 21; Administration of Justice
Act, 1990, §§ 51-52 (Eng.).
85. Access to Justice Act, supra note 36, § 52(2).
86. Id.
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Where a plan is required but the professional body fails to submit
one that the LSCC considers adequate for securing that such complaints
are handled effectively and efficiently, or if a professional body submits
a plan but fails to act in accordance with it, the LSCC may require the
body to pay a penalty. 7 Before requiring the body to pay a penalty, the
LSCC must afford it a reasonable opportunity to appear and make
88 Scerepresentations. The Secretary of State must specify the maximum
amount of the penalty which is the lesser of £Lm or one percent of the
body's income.
89
In determining the penalty, the LSCC must have regard to all the
circumstances of the case including, in particular, the total number of
complaints about members of the body and, where the penalty is imposed
for a failure to handle complaints in accordance with a plan, the number
of complaints not so handled, as well as the assets of the body and the
number of its members. 90 The penalty is paid to the Commissioner who
pays it to the Secretary of State. 91 A Legal Services Consumer Board has
been set up to advise the LSCC on consumer issues, and assist in
identifying what the consumer expects from complaints handling in legal
92service provision.
The Legal Complaints Service ("LCS") and SRA Improvement Plan
2006-07 were declared inadequate by the LSCC on April 3, 2006. The
LSCC found that the Plan did not include all the targets she had set, nor
did it aim to deliver sufficient improvements in complaints handling
which consumers and the profession "expect and deserve., 93 The LSCC
provided the LCS and the SRA with an opportunity to make
representations as to whether she should impose a penalty, which they
did, orally and in writing.94 Taking all these into account, she notified
the Law Society on May 17, 2006 that she was levying a penalty of
£250,000.95 In July 2006, the LCS and the SRA submitted a new
Improvement Plan.96 On 28 July, she considered this to be adequate.
97
She adjusted the penalty to £220,000 in recognition of the co-operation
87. Id. § 52(3)(a),(b).
88. Id. § 52(5).
89. Id.
90. Access to Justice Act, supra note 36, § 52(6).
91. Id. § 52(7).
92. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER, supra note 73, at 67.




97. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER, supra note 73, at 12.
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shown by the LCS and the SRA, and the fact that they submitted an
adequate Plan.98 The Law Society paid this sum in August 2006. 9
In 2006-2007, the LSC Commissioner moved to a "more co-
operative process for agreeing" the Law Society's LCS and SRA
Improvement Plan for 2007-2008."°0 She encouraged the Boards to
include aspects of their Improvement Agendas in their final Plan that she
could independently measure and monitor.10' In other words, the
Commissioner sought a "change of culture and ethos in their
organisations to truly deliver a better service for consumers and the
profession."'
10 2
The LCS and SRA complaint-handling performance in 2006-2007
was "a very mixed picture."' 0 3 While encouraging results had been
achieved on how quickly cases had been handled, this had not been
matched by achievement of all the quality targets: "Getting to grips with
their own processes and embedding them into their culture still appears
to pose a significant challenge to the Law Society's LCS and SRA.'
10 4
In her Improvement Plan 2006-2007, the Commissioner set thirteen
targets for the LCS and SRA in three strategic areas: timeliness, the
quality of decisions, and the implementation of the Plan.105
The Legal Services Act abolishes the offices of the LSCC and the
LSO.' °6 When the OLC becomes operational, it will appoint a Chief
Ombudsman, 10 7 who must be a layperson, 10 8 and, possibly, other assistant
ombudsmen. The OLC will administer the ombudsman scheme, which is
far more elaborate and detailed than the prior scheme. 10 9
Even though the OLC chairman and a majority of members must be
laypeople, 110 the OLC must still get the consent of the LSB in making the
ombudsman scheme rules."1 The LSB may also give guidance to the
OLC on any matter it likes." 2 Thus, the overall effect of the Legal
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. Id. at 30.
100. Id. at 7.
101. Id.
102. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER, supra note 73, at 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 12 (explaining that 9 out of 13 are related to timeliness and quality while
the remaining four are related to internal management issues).
106. LSA, supra note 36, § 159(1).
107. Id. § 122(1).
108. Id. § 122(2).
109. See generally id. pt. 6.
110. Id. sched. 15, paras. 2(l)-(2).
Ill. LSA, supra note 36, § 155(l)(a).
112. Id. § 162.
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Services Act is to reinforce even further the independence of regulators
from the professions they regulate.
In 2006, in anticipation of the Act and "seeing which way the wind
was blowing,"'' 13 the professions changed their governance structures.
1 14
The regulatory functions of the Bar Council were taken over by the Bar
Standards Board in 2006. More significantly, the Law Society formally
separated into three distinct bodies: the Law Society-the representative
body for solicitors; the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("SRA")-which
conducts the regulation of solicitors and deals with some consumer
complaints where misconduct of a solicitor is alleged; and the Legal
Complaints Service ("LCS") (formerly, until January 2007, the
Consumer Complaints Service), which handles consumer complaints
about service by solicitors."'
Each of these bodies has its own Chief Executive and, in the case of
the LCS and the SRA, their own Board. 1 6 The Law Society has its own
Council and Corporate Governance Board."i7 The LSCC welcomed "the
relative independence that the SRA and LCS Boards have from those
that represent solicitors."' 18
The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ("SDT"), which is the statutory
tribunal whose primary function is to consider and adjudicate upon
allegations of professional misconduct or breaches of professional rules
by solicitors and solicitors' employees, is also constitutionally
independent of the Law Society, although its administration is funded by
the Society." 9 The SDT may order the striking off the Roll, suspension,
or the payment of a penalty.12
0
113. BOON&LEvIN, supranote 11, at 138.
114. Id.
115. Although the SRA and LCS operate as different entities, the governance
arrangements remain the same and the Law Society Council approves the budget of all
three, and is responsible to the Commissioner for its Improvement Plan and how
complaints are handled in accordance with this Plan. Although the Commissioner's
powers relate to the Law Society, as the professional body, the LCS and the SRA have
been delegated the responsibility for submitting an Improvement Plan to the
Commissioner. The statutory responsibility remains with the Law Society. There is an
overlap between the LCS and the SRA with regards to complaints handling and they
submit a joint Plan. However, the overwhelming majority of the improvement plan
relates to LCS and the remainder to SRA. LEGAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER
supra note 73, at 11.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. Id. at7.
119. Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, Welcome, www.solicitorstribunal.org.uk (last
visited Oct. 3, 2008).
120. Id.
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C. New Structures of Legal Practice
Another striking feature of the Legal Services Act is its removal of
certain restrictions on the practice of law and its potential sources of
funding. For example, the introduction of so-called Legal Disciplinary
Practices allows firms to be owned and managed by lawyers and non-
lawyers.
There will be restrictions: at least seventy-five percent of the
number of managers must be legally qualified. There can be up to
twenty-five percent individual non-lawyer managers if approved by the
SRA. Non-lawyer ownership is also restricted to twenty-five percent of
the overall ownership, but no external ownership of the LDP is
permitted.' 2' In other words, non-lawyer owners must also be managers.
The LDP will be approved to offer only solicitor or other relevant legal
services; it will not be a multi-disciplinary practice.122 However, the Act
envisages legal services being offered to the public by all types of legal
practitioners,123 together for the first time. The Ministry of Justice is
currently working with the various legal regulators, such as the SRA, to
enable these structures to emerge.' 24  In July 2008, the SRA Board
published a draft amendment to the Solicitors' Code of Conduct to
provide for LDPs. 25 If approved, the new rules are expected to come in
to force in March 2009.126
An ABS-or "licensed body"' 27 -will go much further than the
LDP. An ABS will allow the creation of multidisciplinary practices.
Not only will lawyers be able to share the management and control of the
firm with non-lawyers, an ABS will also be able to provide any type of
legal services, both reserved and unreserved, as well as other related
services such as insurance, surveying and so on. 2 8 In other words, an
121. Managers are partners in a partnership, members in a limited liability partnership
or directors of a limited company.
122. LSA, supra note 36, sched. 16, para. 82 (inserting § 9A to the Administration of
Justice Act 1985, supra note 44).
123. These include, but are not limited to, licensed conveyancers, barristers, notaries
public, legal executives, patent and trademark agents and law costs draftsmen.
124. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LEGAL SERVICES REFORM FACT SHEET-ALTERNATIVE
BUSINESS STRUCTURES, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/abs-fact-
sheet.pdf.
125. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Legal Services Act-new rules and regulations,
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/lsa-new-rules.page (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
126. SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY, LEGAL SERVICES ACT: NEW FORMS OF
PRACTICE AND REGULATION, 2008, at 4, available at
http://www.sra.org.uk/securedownload/file/478.
127. LSA, supra note 36, § 71(2).
128. Id. pt. 5.
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ABS will be a "one-stop shop" for prospective consumers of legal
services.
ABSs will also be able to raise capital by listing on the stock
exchange, to float their shares, and to be publicly traded.1 29 An ABS can
consist of the same legal practitioners as in an LDP, and may contain no
lawyers. So, it is entirely possible for non-lawyers, including
commercial organizations, to own firms that provide legal services.
1 30
The Legal Services Act thus envisages law as a business, though
there are some safeguards. Regulators will be able to apply to the LSB
to become the licensing authority ("LA") to regulate ABSs. 13 1 Firms will
then apply to the LA for ABS status.132 If a non-lawyer owns greater
than ten percent of the firm, they have to meet a "fitness to own" test. 133
External investors are also subject to this test, which covers honesty,
integrity and reputation, competence, capability and financial
soundness.' 34 Consumers will benefit from greater competition in terms
of choice, price quality and access. Producers will benefit from greater
access to finance, greater flexibility and choice. 1
35
It is anticipated that the first LDP will be licensed in March 2009;136
the first ABS in 2011 or 2012.137 So, what impact will the reforms have
on global firms?
VI. THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM-A NEW VISION?
When the reforms were proposed, it was clear that the business
vision of legal practice was being embraced in the UK. The removal of
self-regulation and the introduction of LDPs and ABSs confirmed the
view that the public interest was to be protected by the market and
market forces rather than by professional self-regulation. Conduct, or
129. Id. By contrast, ABA Model Rule 5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing fees,
practicing in partnership with non-lawyers, or letting non-lawyers own interests in law
firms. Lawyers can obtain outside capital for a separate company that rents buildings and
equipment to the firm. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1998).
130. SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY, LEGAL SERVICES ACT: NEW FORMS OF
PRACTICE AND REGULATION, 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.sra.org.uk/securedownload/file/350.
131. Id. at3.
132. Id. at 4.
133. LSA, supra note 36, pt. 5, sched. 13. The test is whether their ownership is
compatible with the statutory regulatory objectives and whether they are fit and proper to
own the interest. Id.
134. Id.
135. CLEMENTI, supra note 65, at 5.
136. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Legal Services Act-update on our work,
www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/lsa-update.page (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
137. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Consultations, http://www.sra.org.uk/
securedownload/file/350 (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
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misconduct, would still be regulated, but lawyers would not be given any
special, or exclusive, professional status. Thus, if certain legal services
were to be regarded as special in some way (for example, because of the
nature of the advice given), then all providers of such advice, not just
lawyers, would be subject to special regulation.
In the new legal services market, lawyers will have to compete with
others, especially accountants, on a level playing field. And indeed,
several banks have set up legal service departments ready to take
advantage of the Legal Services Act provisions once they come into
force.' 38 Other organizations, such as the Royal Automobile Club, are
expanding their legal service departments in anticipation. 13 9 But what
about global law firms? How will the reforms affect them?
In this section I review the opportunity and the threat posed by the
reform proposals for global law firms. First, I argue that the "business"
aspects of the reforms may well have little, or no, impact on global law
firms, especially if they decide not to take up the ABS option. Secondly,
I will show that the proposed shift of vision, away from profession to
business, actually posed a threat rather than an opportunity for global law
firms. In fact, late amendments to the legislation were made in order to
restore certain professional core values to alleviate this threat. Given the
reforms' emphasis on business, why was this done? Was it a belated
acceptance of the profession's own view, as expressed by the CCBE, the
ABA and other professional associations, that self-regulation is a core
principle? Did the government acknowledge the view that lawyers are,
in fact, unique or, at least, that the lawyer's professional function is an
essential condition for the rule of law and democracy in society?
My argument is that the late changes were actually in harmony with
the business/market ideology of the reformers. Indeed, it appears that the
commercial position of English global law firms will be not merely
protected but positively reinforced by a "professional" vision. In this
sense, there is no longer any business/profession dichotomy.
A. Opportunity
It was argued by some that the reforms would be good for U.K.-
based global law firms. Liberalisation of ownership structures in the
U.K., it was said, would "enable more effective competition and
expansion into [international legal services] markets further into the
future.' 40 The introduction of ABSs and outside equity could give the
138. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 11, at 34 (referring to the Co-operative and Halifax
banks (Co-Operative Legal Services and Halifax Legal Solutions)).
139. Id. The Automobile Association has also entered the legal services market.
140. Dow & LAPUERTA, supra note 35, at 12.
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U.K. an "unprecedented global competitive advantage in the legal
marketplace."'' 41 For example, a law firm specializing in the project
finance of international energy projects would benefit from having
engineers working alongside lawyers. Giving the engineers stock in the
firm--or even making them partners-might be important as a means of
rewarding them. 142
The ABSs will not in fact have the major impact that some have
predicted unless law firms decide to opt for this structure. No doubt
many law firms will do so, but it is entirely predictable that global law
firms will not, preferring instead to retain, in the medium and long-term,
their partnership status. There are several reasons for this.
First, global law firms are not capital-intensive. When profits are
high and debt financing is readily available, they have little need of
outside equity. Clients of global firms are "expert buyers of legal
services" and, as such, "go to the best practices, wherever they are.' 43
They can shop around and have no particular need for "one-stop
shopping." A series of interviews with partners and clients in the U.K.,
conducted between November 2007 and January 2008, found that "[v]ery
few saw law firms rushing to incorporate."' 144 The Legal Services Act
was not expected to change the structure or style of legal partnerships.1
45
Secondly, economic analysis suggests that "[w]ithin the legal
profession, partnerships might be more efficient than corporations in the
provision of those services that are most difficult to value, and less
efficient for those services that are relatively straightforward."' 46 There
is some empirical support for this analysis. For example, in 1970 Booz
Allen Hamilton, a large management consulting firm, dissolved its
partnership and went public, only to buy back its shares and become a
private partnership six years later. According to Business Week, "when
Booz Allen went public, it appeared it might be a trend-setter among
consulting firms. But before long, earnings and the market began to
erode, and service companies lost their allure among investors.' 47
141. Tommy Sangchompuphen, U.K. Bill Predicted to Cause Shake-Up of Global
Legal Services, LAw.COM, June 12, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id =
1149843927137.
142. Dow & LAPUERTA, supra note 35, at 8.
143. Alexia Garamfalvi, England Poised to Reform Legal Market, LAW. COM, Oct.
10, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 1155114327477
(quoting Brian McDonnell, an associate with the London office of Hunton & Williams,
who specializes in financial services and regulatory law).
144. EVERSHEDS, LAW FIRM OF THE 21ST CENTURY-AN EVERSHEDS REPORT 7
(2008), available at www.eversheds.com/2 I stcenturylawfirm.
145. Id.
146. Dow & LAPUERTA, supra note 35, at 6.
147. Id. at 7 n.5.
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By contrast, in the United States, financial service companies have
shifted from partnership status to corporations because information
technology increased the efficiency of their services. 148 In other words,
different firms may adopt different strategies depending on the type of
service they offer clients. Many tax services are amenable to information
technology, and "... in the U.S. in 1997 'measured by revenue, 67% of
tax preparation work was done by corporations, while only 4% was done
by partnerships (almost all of the remainder is done by sole
proprietorships).' ' 149  Corporate structures are predominant amongst
those firms that are allowed to handle certain specialized legal or
paralegal services like title handling. 50 By contrast, "[p]artnerships still
dominate certain aspects of banking and accounting services, but focus
on those areas that involve less information technology and more
personal skill."' 51
It remains to be seen which side of the line particular law firms in
the U.K. will fall. 152 The first ever law firm in the world to go public
was an Australian class action law firm in 2007.113 Whether this firm
repeats the experience of Booz Allen Hamilton remains to be seen. It
should be noted that the giant consulting firm, McKinsey, has no outside
equity.
B. Threat
Global law firms have already experienced competition, consumer
sovereignty and fundamental commercial values. The global legal
services market is already very sophisticated with well-informed clients,
often supported by in-house legal teams and vast human and other
resources. Clients shop around for legal services. Enron, for example,
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id. (quoting Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, A Theory of Partnerships, Q.J.
EcoN., Feb. 2005, at 155.)
150. Id. at 10.
151. Dow& LAPUERTA, supra note 35, at 9.
152. There are about 85,000 solicitors in private practice in England and Wales. See
Stephen Mayson, Referral Repercussions, COUNSEL, July 2008. Just less than half that
number practice in the 9,500 firms of 10 partners or less. See id. The other half practice
in firms of more than 10 partners. See id. What is significant is that there are only
around 500 such firms, yet they generate about two-thirds of total fee income. See id.
There is a significant gulf between the hemispheres of legal practice. See id.
153. Steve Hoare, Aussie Law Firm Listed Today; 8m Shares Traded,
THELAWYER.COM, May 21, 2007, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=
125897. The law firm was Slater & Gordon. The firm's website, www.slatergordon.
com.au, has a section entitled "Investors." In 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia
integrated its legal business, operated by its associated firm, PwCLegal into the broader
PricewaterhouseCoopers partnership under a multidisciplinary partnership structure. In
so doing, it claimed to have created the largest MDP in Australia: www.pwclegal.au.
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not atypically for large corporations, used hundreds of outside law
firms. 154
On the face of it, therefore, the intrusion of the marketplace and
business values into legal practice envisaged by the U.K. reforms should
not have constituted a threat to global law firms. Yet, as one senior
lawyer put it, "The loss of professional values generally within the
market will make it harder for us to operate."'155  This comment
highlights a paradox that lies at the heart of the U.K. reforms. If the
market is deemed to be the most appropriate regulator, why should legal
professional values be retained?
The problem for global law firms is that the market vision is not
universally embraced. Indeed, as we have seen, even the EU itself,
although founded on market values, including competition, has endorsed
the professional vision of law. As a result, in the EU there has been no
attempt to create a "level playing field" between Member States by
harmonizing the regulation of the legal services market, Each Member
State is free to regulate its legal profession in its own territory, according
to its own vision of legal practice. 156 Consequently, professional rules
and regulations differ from state to state. This means too that there could
be a conflict between the visions of the nature of legal services in
different countries. Thus, while some Member State rules, such as in the
Dutch case, protect the market for lawyers, others, such as those in the
U.K., expose lawyers to free competition in the market for legal services.
This diversity of vision within Europe-and beyond-means that
English global law firms could be excluded from operating in some
countries on the grounds that they lack some of the essential
characteristics of professionalism. The risk of exclusion may be much
greater if law firms adopt ABS, MDP or even LDP structures. The
possibility of exclusion may reinforce the other factors deterring global
law firms from adopting, in particular, the ABS structure, with the
outside investment that it entails.
57
However, eschewing these structures might not have been sufficient
to save English firms from exclusion from the global legal services
marketplace. For, at the heart of the reform proposals was, along with
the end of self-regulation, what appeared to be the loss of the core value
of professional independence. When the Legal Services Bill was
proposed, the Lord Chancellor was to have the power to appoint the LSB
154. Whelan, supra note 6, at 1077.
155. Email from John Gould, Senior Partner, Russell-Cooke, to Christopher J.
Whelan (Apr. 15, 2008).
156. See Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971.
157. See generally Garamfalvi, supra note 143.
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Chairman without consultation. 158 The LSB, in turn, would have been
given sweeping powers to intervene in the work of the front line
regulators and to impose substantial fines.159 We have already seen how
the Legal Services Complaints Commissioner has begun to wield the
power she has been given.
While the underlying structure of most of the reforms was
welcomed by the legal professional bodies, it was this particular feature
of the proposal that they resisted. One typical example was a comment
by a member of the Bar Council in July 2007, in the widely read New
Law Journal, which urged the government to counter concerns about the
Legal Services Bill's threat to independence.'
60
As a result, "substantial lobbying"'161 of the government continued
throughout the legislative process, focusing on the role of the LSB. A
particular concern was global legal practice and the fear that "some of
the bill's regulatory implications could taint the [U.K.] firms' reputation
for independence and complicate their foreign operations."' 162 In a letter
to a government minister from the Chairman of the Bar Council and the
senior partners of five global law firms, "[t]he potential effect on foreign
earnings, if the LSB is perceived to lack independence from government
was re-emphasised. ,,163
Considerable concern was also voiced by overseas Bars about the
possible compromising of independence. Jo Stevens, president of the
Flemish Bar, wrote an open letter in June 2007 expressing his "concerns
about the independence of the Bar and the Law Society... from
Government and outside capitalists" and "giving way to obsolete and
easy ideas of consumerism."' 64 He "criticised Britain for setting a bad
example to other nations" and, "in strong language," quoted "a former
president of the Law Society of Zimbabwe cautioning against a situation
in which autocratic leaders could defend the appointment of partisans to
govern the Bar and threaten the independence of the judiciary by saying
they were doing no more than following the British example."' 165 U.K.
158. Legal Services Bill [HL], supra note 70.
159. Id.
160. Desmond Browne, Warning Shots, 157 NEw L.J. 949, 949 (2007).
161. Briefing from The Law Society, supra note 72, at 4.
162. Garamfalvi, supra note 143.
163. Browne, supra note 160. The chairman of the Bar Council was Geoffrey Vos
QC. The five firms were the so-called "magic circle": Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance,
Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer, Linidaters, and Slaughter & May. The Lawyer Global
100 2006, http://www.thelawyer.com/global 100/2006/tb-1-25.html# (last visited Oct. 7,
2006). In 2006, these five were in the top seven largest law firms in the world by
revenue. Id. (listing Clifford Chance as "number one").
164. Browne, supra note 160.
165. Id.
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firms too were "worried about [their] possible exclusion from overseas
markets as a result."
1 66
The lobbying was reflected in concerns raised in parliament and in
amendments made during the passage of the Bill. "A joint parliamentary
committee scrutinizing the bill stated that public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession will not be sustained, nor will its
international significance continue, if there is a perception that its
independence is jeopardized in any way."'
67
In the House of Lords, the government was defeated on aspects of
the bill on at least six occasions, despite its inbuilt majority. For
example, Lord Neill QC proposed an amendment that would "require the
concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice to the appointment of members of
the LSB." 68 A senior judge, "Lord Woolf joined with the [government]
peer, Lord Brennan QC, in warning of the international implications for
legal business worth £2 billion a year if the perception got about that the
independence of the profession was threatened."' 169 The amendment
passed.
Another amendment proposed was to restrict intervention by the
LSB. As originally drafted, the LSB could intervene whenever it
considered there had been an adverse impact on any of the eight
regulatory objectives set out in the Act. The amendment proposed that
intervention be restricted to cases where there was a significant adverse
impact on the regulatory objectives of the Act taken as a whole. 170 This
amendment also passed.
A further amendment, also successful, required the LSB to respect
the principle that the primary responsibility for regulation rested with the
approved regulator and to intervene only when the approved regulator
exceeded the ambit of what was reasonable.
171
All the lobbying paid off; it was "extremely successful."' 72 The
Law Society "lobbied successfully to secure key improvements to the
original bill.... [The A]ct now provides a sound basis for the regulation
of legal services. . . , and secures our standing as a highly-regarded and
independent legal jurisdiction."
1 73
Fundamental to the issue of independence is the extent to which the
judiciary plays a part in the appointment of the chair and members of the
166. Young, supra note 72, at 10.
167. Garamfalvi, supra note 143.
168. Browne, supra note 160.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Legal Services Bill [HL], supra note 70, § 41(1)(b).
172. Briefing from the Law Society, supra note 72, at 4.
173. Id. at 3.
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new Legal Services Board. Now, the Lord Chancellor only-and not, as
proposed, the Minister of Justice-can appoint the Chair (a lay person)
and members of the LSB, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice
("LCJ"). 174 The Lord Chancellor has a statutory duty to uphold the rule
of law and will also be expected to follow guidelines issued by the Office
for the Commissioner of Public Appointments ("OCPA"). 175 The OCPA
is also independent of the government and her role is to regulate,
monitor, report and advise on public appointments. 1
76
The Law Society received assurances that this consultation means a
real involvement in the process for the LCJ. The Society seems to be
convinced that "the involvement of the LCJ further helps to ensure there
can be no arbitrary elements in the procedure and that no appointment is
political in nature. Maintaining the independence of the legal profession
is now one of the eight regulatory objectives for the LSB contained in the
act." 177 Thus, one of the most significant changes was to "preserve the
independence of the legal profession from government."'
' 78
The Act now makes clear that the primary responsibility for
regulation is with the front line regulators. 79 Day-to-day regulation of
legal services should take place free from undue interference by the LSB.
Before intervening and exercising its powers, the LSB must first try to
resolve matters informally. 80 The LSB is independent of government
and can interfere only when the actions of regulators are "palpably
unreasonable,"' 8' that is, only if there is a significantly adverse impact on
the regulatory objectives. 
82
So, why did the government agree to these amendments? With its
significant inbuilt majority, it clearly was not forced to do so. Were they
belated concessions to professionalism and a resuscitation of the
business/profession dichotomy? On the contrary, it is apparent that the
government was persuaded that it was in the U.K.'s economic interests to
protect the competitive advantages enjoyed by English law and by
English global law firms.
As one commentator noted, "U.K. firms are a dominant force in the
international market, and English law is used as a basis for a large
174. LSA, supra note 36, sched. 1, § 1(3).
175. Briefing from The Law Society, supra note 72, at 4.
176. OCPA, The Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments,
www.ocpa.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 7, 2008). The Commissioner issues a Code of
Practice. Id.
177. Briefing from The Law Society, supra note 72, at 4.
178. Id.
179. LSA, supra note 36, pt. 4.
180. LSA, supra note 36, § 41(3).
181. John Ludlow, A Class Act, 157 NEw L.J. 1553, 1554 (2007).
182. Browne, supra note 160.
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percentage of international transactions, but leading firms have warned
that the changes could compromise this competitive advantage."1 83 The
data are indeed impressive: "The industry generated £19 billion (about
$36 billion) of revenue in 2003, accounting for 1.73% of the UK's
GDP."'184 The exportation of the U.K.'s legal services abroad grew in
size almost six times between 1991 and 2006, from £445 million to
£2,612 million. 85 The surplus created by the "gap" between these
exports and imports of legal services into the U.K. widened from £425
million in 1991 to over £2 billion in 2006.186
A large percentage of international business transactions rely on
English law. English lawyers have successfully exported their services
to support such transactions, in competition with lawyers from other
countries. English law firms are, however, the dominant force in the
international market. Thus, for example, after many years of
negotiations, the English Law Society "persuaded the Korean authorities
to start ... to liberalise their legal services market." '87 In the Middle
East, in 2008, "[t]here is no question that English law and London-based
law firms are the dominant force."
' 188
Therefore, English lawyers and law firms remain very well placed
in the global legal services market. With the principle of mutual
recognition in the EU allowing English lawyers to practice elsewhere in
the EU, with London as an international financial centre, and with U.K.
lawyers leading the way, all that was required from the government was
to ensure that one of the core professional values-independence-be
preserved. As a result, English lawyers should continue to enjoy a
competitive advantage in a EU where professional values, such as
independence and confidentiality are protected, but where English firms
can compete freely in other Member States. Thus, while the Dutch,
according to EU law, lawfully prohibit MDPs, Dutch firms may have to
compete with English firms, constituted as LDPs or as ABSs, offering
services that the Dutch firms cannot offer, but which Dutch clients may
prefer.
English firms - MDPs or ABSs - may also have a competitive
advantage over law firms in the U.S. too, where MDPs have been, for the
183. Garamfalvi, supra note 143.
184. Id.
185. Faulconbridge et. al., supra note 7, at 457.
186. Id. at 458.
187. Des Hudson, Grasping the Nettle, 157 NEW L.J. 132, 134 (2007).
188. Edward Fennell, Helping to Build the New Byzantium, THE TIMES (London),
June 12, 2008, at 61 (quoting Joseph Huse, an American lawyer with Freshfields, based
in Dubai).
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most part, rejected. 89 Indeed, the spill-over effect of globalization within
the U.S. is already being felt. 190  For example, Rider Bennett, a
Minnesota firm, closed its doors after forty-seven years stating that it was
unable to keep up with the global market.1 91 The firm only had offices in
the Twin Cities.
U.K. law firms, after the reforms, with their independence and
confidentiality privileges protected and with the value-added services
that they can offer, will also be in an excellent position to compete
globally with accountancy firms. It should not be forgotten that although
the largest accountancy firms far exceed the size of the largest global law
firms, the legal marketplace sector, at around £217 billion globally, is
about twice that of the accountancy sector.
192
VII. CONCLUSION
In the U.K., the idea that the lawyer's professional function is an
essential condition in society has been flatly rejected. The predominant
political view which seems to have emerged is that legal services ought
to be treated more like a business than a profession; they should be
regulated by the market rather than by professional self-regulation.
The U.K. reforms, set out in the Legal Services Act of 2007, appear
to signal an end to professionalism, the final intrusion of the marketplace
into legal services, and the victory of the business vision of legal
practice. That is why the reforms are often characterized as the birth of
"Tesco Law" (the functional American equivalent would be "Wal-Mart
law").
193
Yet, what has emerged confounds this analysis. Rather than ditch
finally the illusions and pretensions of professionalism, the U.K. reforms
have instead sought to enshrine key elements of professionalism within a
market model. In England at least, law should be both a business and a
profession.
189. John Gibeaut, It's a Done Deal: House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chance for
MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92 (2000).
190. James C. Moore, Economic Globalization and Its Impact Upon the Legal
Profession, N.Y.B.J., May 2007, at 35; Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to
Transnational Lawyering and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers,
34 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989 (2001).
191. All Things Considered, Rider Bennett law firm closing its doors (NPR radio
broadcast Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/
web/2007/04/1 0/riderbennett/.
192. David Gray, New Study Shows Elite Firms Less Dominant as Fee Pressures
Mount Profession-Wide, OF CoUNS., Apr. 2008, at 8.
193. It should be noted that Tesco has been offering legal services in the U.K. since at
least 2004, when it began to offer advice on divorce, employment and business online.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
But, in coming to this conclusion, U.K. reformers have not accepted
the rhetoric of the CCBE, the ABA, or other professional associations
that self-regulation is a core principle. Nor have they accepted the
assertion that the lawyer's professional function is an essential condition
for the rule of law and democracy in society. Instead, what has emerged
in the debates about business versus profession is an analysis that
appears to reconcile the dichotomy: professionalism is good for
business! So, global law practice has been reconstituted as a hybrid:
business and profession.
One of the paradoxes of this analysis is that the beneficiaries of the
reforms, at the international level, are not the consumers of legal
services, but the law firms themselves. Whereas in an unregulated
market, competitors of global law firms-accountants especially-have
an advantage, in the reconstituted global legal services market, only law
firms can offer clients legal services which add value in terms of the
professional protections exclusive to the practice of law--confidentiality
and independence in particular.
It has been suggested that "[t]he aggressive international
performance of English firms is something the government does not want
to lose."' 94 Boon and Levin's prediction, that this might lead the state to
make a compromise with the legal profession through "continued
sponsorship of professional power,"'' 95 was spot on. Indeed, this may be
why the Legal Services Act will be amended in the near future after it
was discovered that it "(unintentionally) prevents LLPs from having
more than one level of corporate membership."' 96  Many large
international law firms, "[f]or regulatory and financial reasons...
developed complex, multi-tiered structures incorporating several
corporate members."1 97 After the SRA warned that these firms may have
to change their structures in order to comply with the Legal Services
Act,' 98 the SRA indicated that, instead, the Act may be amended to allow
a law firm, whether an LDP or an ABS, to have more than two tiers of
corporate ownership.199
Jurisdiction over work in the workplace has been called the "key to
professional power."200 In the U.K., the professional image that has been
re-constructed is no longer one that "disqualifies outsiders as too close to
194. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 11, at 67.
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business-too unprofessional, 20 ' but, rather, one that embraces a
business vision and disqualifies outsiders in order to protect the business
of law. The U.K. public interest, as redefined, is macroeconomic, and
the legal profession has been protected to further that public interest. In
the global legal services marketplace at least, from a U.K. perspective,
profession and business have become, synonymous.
201. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 5, at 617.
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